Grimm v. Grim by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation








GRIMlI1 v. GRIMM 
[26 C.2d 173; IS7 P.2d 841] 
[L. A. No. 18998. In Bank. Mar. 27,.1945.] 
173 
CLARA GRHrIM, Respondcnt, v. WALTER E. GRIMM, et at, 
as Administrators, etc., Appcllants .. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Insurance Policy. 
-Where the premiums on an insurance policy issued on the 
.husband's life are paid wi~h community funds, the policy is 
community property. 
[2] Id. - Community Property-Disposition--Voluntary Transfer 
as Voidable. - Although an insurance contract may provide 
that the insured husband has the right to change the bene-
ficiary without the wife's consent where she is named as such, 
any change of beneficiary without her consent and without 
a valuable consideration is voidable, and after the husband's 
death the wife may maintain an action for her community 
share in the proceeds of the policy. 
[8] Insurance - Beneficiaries - Nature of Beneficiary'.lDterest.-
The interest of a beneficiary designated by an insured who 
has the right to change the beneficiary is, like thai of a legatee 
under a will, a mere expectancy of a gift at the time of the 
insured's death. 
[4] Assignments - Interests Assignable - Expectancies. - .4.n. as-
signment or release of an expectancy becomes enforceable in 
equity when the expectancy has developed into a right. 
[5] Id. - Interests Assignable-Expectancies.-A contract consti-
tutes an equitable assignment or renunciation of an expectancy 
only if' it expressly or by necessary implication so provides. 
[6] Husband and Wife - Property Settlement Agreements-Inter-
pretation.-Courts weigh carefully the language of property 
settlement agreements before concluding that they eliminate 
rights the disavowal of which is not necessarily connected 
with the purpose of such agreeements. 
[2J Application of community property system to problems 
arising in connection with insurance policies, note, 114 A.L.R. 545, 
554. See, also, 3 CalJur. lO-Yr. Supp. 622: 11 Am.Jur. 197. _ 
[3] See 14 OaLJur. 583; 29 Am.Jur. 952. 
[4] Validity and eft'ect of transfer or expectancy by prospective 
heir, notes, 17 A.L.R. 597; 44 A.L.R. 1465; 121 A.L.R. 450. See, 
also, 3 Oal.Jur. 251; 9 Cal.Jur. 478; 4 Am.Jur. 270. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Husband and W~e, § 56; [2] Hus-
band and Wife, § 103(5); [3] Insurance, § 221; [4,5] Assignments, 
§ 25; [6] Husban.d and Wife, § 157(6); [1] Wills, § 239; Insuranoe, 
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[7] Wills - Revocation: Insurance - Beneficiaries -- Change of 
Beneficiary.-Since a hushand has th(> poY,er to rHok,' hi~ 
will or to change belleficiaries named in an in~lll'allc(> poliey, 
his failure to do so ordinarilv indicntes that h(' did not wish to 
effect a change and in eff;ct amounts to a confirmatioll of 
the will or the designation of the wife in the policy. B"th 
instruments are to be read as expressiug the decc(]('nt's in-
tentions at the time of his death. 
[8] Husband and Wife - Property Settlement Agreements - Ef-
fect.-A property settlemeut agreemeut in which the wife 
relinquished all interest in the husband's insurallce policy 
payable to her did not show an intention to give up more than 
her community rights therein, and a provision that he could 
change the beneficiary indicated that there was no immediate 
change and that she would remain the beneficiary unless he 
exercised his right to change the beneficiary. And an inten-
tion to exclude from the agreement rights that might accrue to 
the wife at the husband's death as a result of his bounty 
was indicated by a further provision that she waived all rights 
of inheritance except as might be provided in his will. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Myron Westover, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for declaratory relief. Judgment for plaintiff 
affirmed. 
John J. Craig and Rush M. Blodget for Appellants. 
Stephen Monteleone for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-ln January, 1941, plaintiff and Lewis 
Grimm were divorced. In December, 1939, they entered into 
a property settlement agreement that provided for a division 
of their community property, which included an insurance 
policy on the life of the husband, issued in 1930 and naming 
the wife as beneficiary. The agreement made this policy the ... 
separate property of the husband and gave him the right to 
change the beneficiary. He died in April, 1943, without hav-
ing made such a change. He had not remarried, and he left 
no issue. After his death, plaintiff claimed the proceeds of 
the insur~nce policy as the beneficiary thereof and brought 
this action for a declaration of her rights. The insurance com-
pany under stipulation paid the money due on the policy into 
MJ.rt and was dismissed from the action. The trial eourt 
) 
./ 
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entered judgment for plaintiff, and defendant.s, the tldminis-
trators of IJewif: Grimm's estate, appeal. Defendants COll-
tend that tIle est.ate is entitlcrl to the proceeds on the ground 
that the agl'eement bet ween t he spouses term ina teo all rights 
of plnintiff with respect to the policy, including the right to 
recei\'e the insurance money as the benefieiary thereof. 
[1] All prcmiums were pnicl with communit~, funds and 
the policy was thf'rcfore cOTllmnnit.y property at the time of 
the property settlement agn>(,nlent. (1'mvciers Ins. CO. Y. 
F01lcher, 219 Cal. 35],356 12fi P.2rl 482]; Blethen v. p([cific 
]f[u.(. L. Ins. Co., ]98 Cal. 91. 09 [243 P. 431J; New York 1>-i[tJ 
Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal.App. 602, 606 [214 P. 61]; 
Jenkins v . . Jenkins, 112 Cnl.App. 402, 409 1297 P. 5G1.) 
[2] It is settled that even though the insurance contract 
Illay provide that the insured husband has the right to cha.nge 
the beneficiary without the wife's consent where she is named 
as such. any 'change of beneficiary without her consent and 
without a valuable consideration is voidable, and after the 
death of thE' husband the wife may maintain an action for 
her community share in the proceeds of the policy. (Alaznwn 
v. Brown, 12 Cal.App.2d 272, 275 [55 P.2d 53ft]; Travelers' 
Ins. Co. v. Fancher, supra, at p. 356: Dixon Dumber Co. v. Pea-
cock, 217 Cal. 4Hi, 418 [lft P.2d 2331: B7ethen v. Pacific 'Af1d. 
L. Ins. Co., supra, at p. 101: see 3 CaI.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. 622; 
114 A.L.R. 545, 554.) A wife, however, can release this com-
munity interest in the insurance policy and stilI be a bencfi-
eiar? thereof. If she executes such a release and the husbanil 
revokes hif; designation of her as beneficiary she has no right 
to the insurance proceeds upon his death; but if he fails to 
revoke his designation of her as ben efi eian' , she is entit.led, 
like any other beneficiary, to the pro('eeds of the policy at the 
time of his death. She would not be entWed to such proceeds, 
howE'ver, if the parties agreed that no rights were to a('('rne 
to her, even thoug-h she remained the beneficiary at the time 
of the husband's death. It remains t.o be determined. there-
fore, whether the spouses in the present case agreed, not only 
that the policy should become the separate property of the -
husband, but that no right..q should accrue to plaint.iff even 
though she remained the hrneficiar? at the time of the hus-
band's death. 
[3] Tke interest of a belleficiary designated by an insured 
.... 
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who has the right to change the beneficiary is, like that of a 
legatee under a will, a mere expectancy of a gift at the time 
of the insured's death. (Page v. Washington Mutual Life 
Assn., 20Cal.2d 234, 242 fl25 P.2rl 20]; CookY. Coole, 17 Cal. 
2d 639, 644 [111 P.2d 322); Blethen v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 
Co., ]98 Cal. 91, 98 [243 P. 431] ; Mn.hony v. Crocker, 58 Cal. 
App.2d 1%, 202 [136 P.2d 81O}; JlIutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Franck,9 Cal.App.2d 528,537 [50 P.2d 480]; FIack v. Metz, 
173 S.C. 413 [176 S.E. 314. 95 A.L.R. 196]; see 14 Cal.Jur. 
583: 29 Am.Jur., Insurance. § 1276, p. 952.) [4] An as-
signment or release of an expectancy becomes enforceable in 
equity when the expectancy has developed into a right. (Ben· 
nett v. Forrest, 24 Cal.2d 485. 492 rJ50 P.2d 4161: Estate of 
Crane, 6 CaI.2d 2]8 [57 P.2d 476, 104 A.IJ.R. 1101) j Anglo 
California Nat. Bank v. Kidd, 58 Cal.App.2d 651, 655 [137 
P.2d 460]; Bridge v. Kedon, ]63 Cal. 493, 500 [126 P. 149, 
43 L.R.A.N.S. 404]; Estate of Edelman, 148 Cal. 233, 238 
[82 P. 962, 113 Am.St.Rep. 2311; Estate of Garcelon, 104 
Cal. 570, 584 r38 P. 414. 43 Am.St.Rep. 134. 32 L.R.A. 595]; 
see 17 A.L.R. 597; 44 A.L.R. 1465; 121 A.L.R. 450; 3 CaLJur. 
251; 9 Cal.Jur. 478; 4 Am.Jur., Assignments, § 51, p. 270.) 
[5] It is settled, however, that a contract constitutes an 
equitable assignment or renunciation of an expectancy only 
if it expressly or by necessary implication so provides. (Es-
tate of Jones, 118 Cal. 499, 502 [50 P. 766, 62 Am.St.Rep. 
2511 see 4 Pomeroy, Equity ,Jurisprudence, § 1290.) [6] In 
interpreting property settlement agreements courts weigh 
carefully the language of the agreements before concluding 
that they eliminate rights the disavowal of which is not nec-
essarily connected with the purpose of such agreements. (Es-
tate of 'McNutt, 36 Cal.App.2d 542. 549 [98 P.2d 253]; Girard 
v. Girard, 29 N.M. ] 89 [221 P. 801, 35 A.L.R. 1493).) This 
court and other courts have therefore applied to property 
settlement agreement'! the rule that general expressions or 
clauses in such agreements are not to be construed as includ-
ing an assignment or renunciation of expectancies and that 
a beneficiary therefore retains his status under an insurance 
policy or under a will if it does not clearly appear from the 
agreement that in addition to the segregation of the property 
of the spouses it was intended to deprive either spouse of the 
right to take property under a will or an insurance contract 
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578 [20 P.2d 325]; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 112 Cal.App. 402, 407 
[297 P. 56) ; Estate of Crane, supra, p. 221; Merchants Nat. 
Bank v. Hubbard, 220 Ala. 372 [125 So. 335]; Equitable 
Life Assur. Soc. v. Stilley, 271 I11.App. 283; see Girard v. 
Girard, 29 N.M. 189 [22] P. 801, 35 A.L.R. 1493]; In re 
Sword, 120 l\lisc. 427 [199 N.Y.S. 672] raff'd, 204 N.Y.S: 
952]; In re Brown's Will, 153 Misc. 282 [274 N.Y.S. 924, 
931 J; In re Griffith's Will, 167 Misc.36G [3 N.Y.S.2d 925, 
927J; Weir v. J(ing, (Tex.Civ.App.) 166 S.W.2d 187; Lindley, 
Separation Agreements, p. 283.) In Estate of Crane, supra, 
this court set forth the considerations that commend the rule 
that expectancies under a will or an insurance policy are re-
garded as waived only when it appears that the attention of 
the parties was directed to such expectancies and their inten-
tion to disclaim future rights that might develop from such 
expectancies was made clear in the contract. [7] Since the 
husband has the power to revoke his will or to change the 
beneficiary named in an insurance policy his failure to do so 
ordinarily indicates that hE' did not wish to effect a change so 
that in effect his failure to act amounts to a confirmation of 
the will or the designation of the wife in the insurance policy. 
Both instrument!'; arE' to be read as expressing the decedent's 
intentions at the time of his death. As was said in Estate of 
Crane, supra, at page 221: "It is to be remembered that 
although the will in which the legacy is contained had been 
executed prior to the date of the contract, the testator lived 
more than two years thereafter. And a will speaks from and 
as of the date of the testator's death.' If the testator had not 
executed this will nntilafter t.he date of the property settle-
ment agreement, it would not be reasonable to say that he 
was without right to make such subsequent will and thereby 
give additional property to his wife. But in substance and 
effect he did the same thing by leaving his will unchanged 
after the date of said contract." Moreover, while a property 
settlement agreement proyides for what the husband is eon-
ceding to his wife as a matter of right, frequently he is willing 
to grant more to her as a matter of bounty, for as recognized 
in Estate of Crane, supra, at page 221, the affection of spouses 
for each other may survive separation agreements and divorce 
proceedings. 
[8] The property settlement agreement in the present ease 
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that this agreement is intenued and shall be construed as, 
and the same shan be, a complete property settlement between 
the parties hereto, and that it comprises, settles and discharges 
all claims arising' or existing, or which may hereafter arise 
by reason of the marrillge of the parties hereto, and that sec-
ond party accepts the provision herein mane for her in full 
satisfaction of her right to support and mllintenance." This 
clause sets fortll -two conditions of the property settlement 
agreement: the wife relinquishes her right'! in an the property 
that was or by virtue of the agreement became separate prop-
ert.y of the husband, and each spouse discharges' all claims 
then existing or in the future arising as a result of the mari-
tal relationship of the parties. Plaintiff bases her claim to the 
insurance proceeds on 'a contract made by the husband in her 
favor while the~' were married and left in effect by him after 
the property settlement agreement and the divorce. She 
makes no claim arising out or the rormer marital relationship, 
nor does she assert a right contrary to her general waiver or 
all rights in the separate property of the husband. 
The property settlement agreement setting forth the com-
munity property described the insurance policy as one in 
which the wife was named as beneficiary. As to the property 
that was to be separate property of the husband, the agree-
ment (designating the husband as first party and the wife 
as second party) provided: "All funds and property of every 
nature described or referred to in said Exhibit A, other than 
the propert~· hereinabove provided to be paid or conveyed to 
second part~', and all property hereinabove referred to as 
now being the separate property of the first party hereto, 
together with all property of any nature hereafter possessed 
or acquired by first party shall be and remain the sole and 
separate property of gaid first party, and second party hereb~' 
conveys, relinquishes and releases to first party all right, title. 
interest and claim which she has or might have therein or 
thereto. Said first party shall have the right to change the 
beneficiary of the life insurance policy, described in Article 
VIII of said Exhibit (A), and second party agrees to execute 
upon request any instrument necessary or convenient to ac-
complish such change, and second party hereby transfers, 
releases and relinquishes to first party all interest in and to 
gaid policy of insurance and the premiums paid thereunder 
and the avails thereof." Under this provision the insurance 
... 
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polic~' was like any other community propert)' that was to 
become separate property of the hushand. There was no 
indication that anything else was intendeo with respect to 
the polic~' The express reference in tht' agreement to the 
rig1lt of the hushand to change the heneficiary inoicates t.hat 
there was no immediate chang!' Imo that tht' wiff' would re-
main the beneficiary of the polic:,\- unles!,: the hushano exer-
cisco his right to change the hpnpfieiary. It was for thf' hns-
band to deciop whether he wishf'o his wife 01' someonf' else t.o 
get the proceeds of the policy. Tf the deeedent. intendeo'that 
plaintiff. who WaR his wifE- for more than thirty years. shouliJ 
have t.he insurance nroceeds. he would natnrally suppose that 
his intent.ion would be fulfilled if he did not change the 
beneficiary .. It is significant. t.hat. he Hved for Revera} years 
after t.he agreement wit.hout making-snch a change. Plaintiff's 
agreement to execute upon the husband's requ€st any inst.ru-
ment necessary 01' convenient t.o change the beneficiary also 
makes it apparent from the face of t.he agreement that there 
waSDO pre..c;ent. renunciation of the wife a.q beneficiary. Plain-
tiff's relinquishment of her intereRt in the "avail!!" of the 
policy does not show an intention to give up more than her 
community rights. which included 8 Rhare in the proceeds 
of the policy. The intention of the spOURes to exclude from 
the agreement rights that might accrue to plaintiff at the 
death of the hu.c;band as a result of his bounty is indicated by 
the provision of the agreement in which plaintiff waived all 
rights of inheritance in her hURband'R estate "except in such 
manner and upon such termR as may be provided in any will 
and/or codicil thereto of first party in effect at the date of 
his death." Since the position of a beneficiary named in a 
life insurance policy aR an object of the bounty of the insured 
is similar to that of a beneficiary of a will (Cook v. Cook, 17 
Ca1.2d 639. 646 [11] P.2d 322]), plaintiff no more relinquished 
the right to take as beneficiary of her husband's insurance 
policy than she relinquished the right to take as beneficiary 
of his will. In this respect there is a clear distinction between 
the present case and Sullivan v. Union Oil Co., 16 Ca1.2d 229 
[105 P.2d 922]. on which defendants mainly rely. In that 
case the parties to the property settlement agreed that" 'each 
hereb~' waive any and all right to the estate of the other 
left at his fir her death and forever quitclaim any and all 
right to share in the same of the other, ••• and hereby re-
... 
) 
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lease and waive all right· to inherit under any will of the 
other . . . and from the date of this agreement . . . they 
shall have all the rights of single persons and maintain the 
same relation of such toward the other'." There was no pro-
vision, as in the present case, to indicate that the parties con-
templated no present renunciation by the husband of the 
wife as beneficiary, but left it to him to decide in the future 
whether or not to change the beneficiary. Moreover, the Sul-
livan case involved, not a contract with an insurance company, 
but an "EmployeeR' Provident Fund" maintained by the 
husband's employer, to which the husband contributed by 
monthly deductions from his salar~·. Under the facts of that 
case all interests of the wife in the fund were regarded as part 
of her interest in the community property and as such reo 
leased in favor of the husband. ' 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. The majority opmlOn takes 
from the estate of decedent and gives to plaintiff property 
("avails" of a specifically described life insurance policy) 
in which the latter has no right, title, or interest. By formal 
written agreement for a valuable consideration the plaintiff 
conveyed to the decedent an of her interest in the a'Va~1s 
of the policy. The exact language used by the parties is: 
"second party [plaintiff) hereby transfers, releases and reo 
linquishes to first party [decedent] all interest in and to said 
policy of insurance and the premiums paid thereunder and the 
ava~7s thereof." (Italics added.) We cannot give effect to 
the words "second party hereby transfers • .. to first party 
all interest in and to said policy . . . and the avails thereof" 
and still permit plaintiff to recover. We have no right to 
give no effect to those words. They are clear and definite in 
meaning. The word "transfer" means "to convey from one 
... person ... to another." (Webster's New Int. Diet. 
(2d ed.).) The majority opinion does not assert, and the 
evidence does not suggest, that the decedent ever reconveyed 
to plaintiff any interest in, to, or under the policy, or its 
"avails." I think that such majority opinion fails to reckon 
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"Plaintiff's relinquishment of her interest in the 'avails' of 
the policy does not show an intention to give up more than 
her community rights, which included a share in the proceeds 
of t.he policy." (Italics added.) The instrument effects an 
out and out conveyance of an interest in the avails of the 
policy. An actual conveyance is_more than a relinquishment. 
Neither do I find convincing the argument in the opinion 
based on the statement that "The intention of the spouses to 
exclude from the agreement rights that might accrue to plain. 
tiff at the death of the husband as a result of his bounty is 
indicated by the provision of the agreement in which plaintiff 
woived all rights of inheritance in her husband's estate 'ex· 
Mpt in such manner and upon such terms as may be provided 
ill any will and/or codicil thereto of first party in effect at the 
date of his death'." The foregoing exception is specific and 
exclusive. It excepts from operation of the relinquishment 
of plaintiff's rights of inheritance from the decedent only 
such rights 88 are encompassed in the language "in such man-
ner and upon such terms as may be provided in any will 
and/or codicil thereto of first party in effect at the date of 
his death." It seems almost trite to have to point out that 
the asserted right claimed in this action by plaintiff is not 
one which is evidenced or created by "terms . . • provided 
in any will and/or eodicil thereto of first party." 
It is an established rule of construction that a proviso or 
exception is used to li:ffiit and qualify that which immediately 
precedes it and to expressly negative a construction or effect 
that would prevail in the absence of the proviso or exception; 
that which is specifically excepted from the operation of the 
general clause would, in the absence of the proviso or excep-
tion, have been included within the operation of such general 
clause. (17 C.J.S. § 343, pp. 796-797 [rule as to contracts]; 
see, also, People ex. rel.HappelZ v. Sischo (1943), 23 Ca1.2d 
478, 493 [144 P.2d 785, 150 A.L.R. 1431] [rule of statutory 
eonstruction].) Furthermore, the express enumeration of 
exceptions indicates the exclusion of any other exceptions. 
(17 C.J.S. § 343, p. 797 [rule as to contracts]; see, also, -
Belloc v. Rogers (1858), 9 Cal. 123, 128; f'YMn v. Walker 
(1869), 35 Cal. 634, 639 [95 .Am.Dee. 152J; Rothschild v. -
Superior Court (1930), 109 Cal.App. 345, 348 [293 P. 106J; 
C.1.'1'. Corp. v. Biltmore Garage (1934), 3 Cal.App.2dSupp. 
757, 761 "[36 P.2d 247]; I" r. D. NH/ (1941), 42 Oal.App. 
\ 
) 
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2d 691, 694 [109 P.2d 741] [rule of statutory construction].) 
There is no presumption in favor of plaintiff. She had sued 
Mr. Grimm, the decedent, for divorce. She contracted with 
him freely, upon an equal footing. 
The declaration in the opinion that "Since the position of 
a beneficiary named in a life insurance policy as an object of 
the bounty of the insured is similar to that of a beneficiary 
of a will r citation 1 plaintiff no more relinquished the right to 
take as a beneficiary of her husband's insurance policy than 
she relinquL"hed the right to take as beneficiary of his will" 
seems to me to be a non sequitur. The exception clause ex-
pressly reserves to plaintiff the right to take as beneficiary 
under a wm or c.odidl thereto but it does not reserve or create 
the right to succeed otherwise to avails of the insurance policy, 
which policy and the "avails thereof" plaintiff had conveyed 
to decedent for a valuable consideration. 
The transfer in writing to decedent of all of plaintiff's 
interest in and to the policy and its "avails" immediately 
divested plaintiff of all her interests in and to such policy and 
its "avails" and vested all of such interest in decedent as 
his separate property. There was no necessity for him to 
change the policy-designated beneficiary; he owned and 
there was vested in him all of such beneficiary's interest. She 
could thereafter acquire no interest in or right to the policy 
proceeds except by affirmative and competent action of the 
decedent to that end. He could have made a will or codicil 
bequeathing such avails to plaintiff but he did not do so. 
He chose to keep such policy and it.c;; avails for himself and 
his estate. His estate is now entitled to have them free of any 
claim of plaintiff, for which she has long since received fair 
compensation and of which she divested herself by voluntary 
action. 
The provision in the agreement by which plaintiff bound 
herself to execute upon Mr. Grimm's request any instrument 
necessary or convenient to change the beneficiary does not, in 
my view, make it apparent, as asserted in the opinion, "that 
there was no present renunciation of the wife as beneficiary" 
in any material sense. Since Mr. Grimm had bought, paid for, 
and received a conveyance of plaintiff's entire interest there_ 
is apparent no essential reason why he should have desired 
or thought that he needed to have the poli('~' itself amended 
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unless he wanted to name some third person as beneficiary. 
To accomplish that end he might well have needed plaintiff's 
execution of a proper document and, therefore, an appropri-
ate covenant to that end was in<'luded in the agreement, but 
in so far as Mr. Grimm's rights against the plaintiff were con-
cerned, if he wanted the avails of the policy to go to his estate, 
he already, in the agreement, had everything which he could 
reasonably anticipate would be needed. 
Lastly, I find no substantial ground for distinguishing this 
case from our opinion in Sullivan v. Union Oil Co. (1940) 
16 Ca1.2d 229, 233 [105 P.2d 922]. The agreement in that 
case provided that "each fhusband and wife] hereby waive 
any and all right to the estate of the other left at his or her 
death and forever quitclaim any and all right to share in the 
same of the other, ... and hereby release and waive all right 
to inherit under any will of the other ... and from the date 
of this agreement ... they shall have all the rights of single 
persons and maintain the same relation of such toward the 
other." The agreement in the case now before us seems more 
certain and efficacious to the end in question than does that 
involved in the Sullivan ease. In addition to the language of 
conveyance and relinquishment hereinabove quoted the agree-
ment we are construing provides that "All funds and prop-
erty of every nature described or referred to in said Exhibit A 
[with certain immaterial exception!; but specifically inelud-
ing the mooted policy] . . . together with all property of 
any nature hereafter possessed or acquired by first party 
[the decedentl shall be and remain the sole and separate prop-
erty of said first party, and second party [plaintiffl hereby 
transfers, conveys, relinql1i!'!hes and releases to first party all 
right, title, interest and claim which she has or might have 
therein or thereto." (Italics added.)· Here the plaintiff not only 
released and relinquished all claim!'! arising out of the marital 
status but she expressly conveyed to the decedent an of her 
interest in and claim to the precise property in controversy. 
Such conveyance. instead of indicating as asserted in the ... 
opinion "that the parties contemplated no present renuncia-
tion by the husband of the wife as beneficiary," in any mate-
rial sense, conclusively establishes that the wife thereupon 
completely divested herself of all interest under the policy, 
specifically including the "avails thereof" and any claim 
which she "might have therein or thereto." In other words 
) 
) 
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she expressly conveyed to Mr. Grimm all of her interest as 
beneficiary and agreed that it should "remain" his "sole and 
separate property." Certainly, he could have reconveyed it 
to her, but he never did so. 
As previously shown, there was no occasion or reason for 
Mr. Grimm, the former husband, to change the name of the 
beneficiary shown in the policy unless and until he wanted 
to designate a third person to that status. Since he appar-
ently wished only to have the proceeds go to his own estate he 
rested upon the eonveyance from plaintiff which, at least so 
far as appears, was never questioned during his lifetime and 
the due exeeution and fairness of which are not now ques-
tioned. We should not now, after his death, enable plaintiff 
to gratuitously take from his estate that which was his. 
The judgment should be reversed. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 23, 
1945. Carter, J., and Sehauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
